Introduction

In August 2025, two months before Argentina's mid-term legislative elections, the Observatorio Latinoamérica–China (OLAC) at the University of Buenos Aires conducted a national survey of 1,162 people across 29 localities in eight regions of the country. Argentina's political polarization was deepening, and international relations had moved to the center of public debate.

Under President Javier Milei, Argentina embarked on a reorientation of its foreign policy, building an exceptionally close relationship with the United States and adopting a confrontational stance toward Beijing. Milei declined the invitation for Argentina to join the BRICS and referred to China as "authoritarian" on multiple occasions. In the context of the trade and tariff war, and as the so-called Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was about to be announced, Milei openly sought Donald Trump's support during the electoral campaign. Trump conditioned the financial "bailout" on the electoral results, while his Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, publicly urged Argentina to scale back its ties with China.

This orientation stands in tension with the economic realities of the country's external relations. Along with Brazil, China is Argentina's main economic partner: a strategic buyer of agricultural exports, an investor in energy and infrastructure, and a source of financial support through the currency swap. Thus, in the context of the trade war between the US and China, the growing US interventionism in Latin America, and the intensification of domestic polarization in a society divided between supporters and opponents of the government's austerity program, international alignments became articulators of political identities.

The survey results show a population that holds a positive image of China with a degree of transversality across political alignments, in contrast to a politically polarized image of the US; that acknowledges US hegemony but perceives China as the global leader of the coming decades; and that supports deepening bilateral ties with China by wide margins. These results partially challenge common assumptions about local politics and public opinion, in a region already feeling the at times oppressive weight of the rivalry between the two global powers.

Sample composition

The sample is semi-probabilistic, weighted by gender, age, region, and education level. Geographic and demographic coverage is representative of Argentina's urban population.

Image of the nations

At the start of the survey, respondents rated their image of a set of countries on a six-point scale, from "very good" to "very bad". The positive image of China (combining "very good" and "good") reaches 60%, compared with 46% for the United States. The negative image ("bad" and "very bad") stands at 12% for China and 26% for the US, yielding a net positive image of +48 for China and +20 for the United States.

Germany leads the overall ranking with a 66% positive image, followed by Brazil (65%), China (60%), the United States (46%), and Russia (33%).

Political identity and the image of nations

The image of nations varies with respondents' political sympathies, but a contrast stands out between China and the US. The positive image of China extends across the political spectrum, whereas the image of the United States is closely tied to party affiliation.

Among Peronist voters, 71% hold a positive image of China. Among those who declared no voting intention, the figure is 61%. Among La Libertad Avanza (Milei) voters, 52% view China favorably.

The image of the US is distributed differently. Among LLA voters, 74% hold a positive view. But among Peronists, only 16% view the US favorably, while 51% hold a negative view. The image of the US is captive to political polarization, embraced on the right and rejected on the left. It should be noted that these data predate the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the US and Israeli attack on Iran; the polarization of the US image may now be even greater.

Comparative attributes of nations

Respondents were also asked which country they most associate with four specific attributes: technology, economic development, international influence, and democracy. The results show that Argentines use different criteria.

In technology, China leads with 54%, followed by Japan (30%) and the United States (12%). In economic development, China also leads (44%), ahead of the US (27%) and Japan (13%). In international influence, however, the US dominates with 70%, with China at 17%. And in democracy, the US leads with 30%, followed by Brazil (21%) and Germany (17%), while China registers 2%.

Argentines appear to associate China primarily with technological and economic capacity, while recognizing US geopolitical hegemony and still granting it democratic credentials. In this regard, the fact that 14% answered "none" to the democracy question, and that Brazil comes in second, is itself noteworthy.

Present and future: who leads the world?

Through a series of open-ended questions, respondents were asked which country they consider the current and future leader in three domains: global influence, economic power, and technological development. The answers point to a clear trend: perceptions of US dominance today coexist with expectations of Chinese leadership in the coming decades.

In global leadership, 64% named the US as the most influential country today, compared with 25% for China. For the future, the perception reverses: 51% chose China and 23% the US. The shift from a 39-point US advantage to a 28-point Chinese advantage represents a sharp change in medium-term expectations.

In economic power, the current gap is narrower (45% US vs. 39% China), suggesting that Argentines perceive economic competition as more evenly matched. In the future projection, China leads with 54% versus 18%.

In technological development, a majority (53%) already identifies China as the current technology leader, ahead of Japan (31%) and the US (9%). In the 20-year projection, China's lead widens to 59%. This perception was shared across political identities.

Perception of China across different dimensions

Beyond the cross-country comparative questions, respondents were asked to rate their perception of China in four specific domains: technology and innovation, economic development, international politics, and political stability. The evaluations were consistently positive, with particularly high ratings on the technological dimension.

In technology and innovation, 94% of respondents rate China positively (66% "very good", 28% "good"), with virtually no negative perceptions. In economic development, the positive perception reaches 89% (47% "very good", 42% "good"). Ratings for international politics (60% positive) and political stability (59% positive) are more moderate, with higher shares of "fair" and "don't know/no answer" responses, suggesting greater uncertainty in areas where everyday familiarity is more limited.

International relations: sovereignty and dialogue

Four statements were presented about the international behavior of China and the United States, asking for the degree of agreement on a four-point scale. Two were symmetrical: "China respects each country's political system" and "The United States respects each country's political system".

On China, 58% agreed (24% strongly agree, 34% somewhat agree); 35% disagreed. On the United States, 28% agreed (8% strongly agree, 20% somewhat agree); 70% disagreed (26% somewhat disagree, 44% strongly disagree). The net agreement gap between the two statements is 65 percentage points (+23 for China, −42 for the US). The statement that "the US tends to act alone while China prefers dialogue" received 65% agreement.

Thus, Argentines tend to perceive China as a more sovereignty-respecting actor on the international stage and one oriented toward dialogue. It is worth noting that the survey was conducted before the capture of Maduro by the US. Nonetheless, US interventionism has a deep history in the region, which contrasts with China's principle of non-interference, both phenomena that appear to be recognized by Argentines.

Perception of bilateral relations

Respondents were asked how they perceive the current state of two bilateral relationships: China–US and China–Latin America. While only 17% consider the China–US relationship positive, 28% see it as negative and 53% as "fair". By contrast, 64% consider the China–Latin America relationship positive, and only 5% considered it negative.

Argentina–China relations

Regarding the bilateral relationship, when asked whether Argentina should strengthen its ties with China, 88% responded affirmatively (43% "yes, without doubt" and 45% "yes, but with limits"). A level of agreement unusual in a highly polarized society, suggesting a widespread pragmatic view of the strategic value of the relationship.

Support is strongest on the economic dimension: 57% consider it "very important" and another 32% "somewhat important". Political relations receive less enthusiastic but still meaningful support (34% "very important", 37% "somewhat important"). The gap between the two suggests that Argentines primarily value China as an economic partner, and show greater caution toward political rapprochement.

Perception of Chinese products

Respondents were asked about their general perception of the quality of products made in China, as well as their degree of trust in specific categories. The historical stereotype of Chinese products as low-quality appears to have weakened considerably. Nearly half (48%) rated them as "medium-high quality" and 16% said "high quality", yielding a combined positive assessment of 64%. Only 7% considered them "low quality".

Trust varies by product category. Home appliances lead with 82%, followed by smartphones and computers (79%) and cars (65%). The exception is medications and vaccines, where distrust (47%) exceeds trust (41%), a recurring topic during the pandemic due to the controversy around Sinopharm and Sinovac.

International news consumption

In a module dedicated to media, respondents were asked which international outlets they consume at least occasionally, from a predefined list of options. CNN leads with 31%, followed by BBC (12%), Telesur (10%), and RT (7%). Chinese media (CGTN and Global Times) each reach about 3%, close to 4.5% combined (audiences partly overlap). 45% of respondents reported not consuming any international media.

The gap between China's positive image and its low media presence in Argentina is part of the high-valuation/low-familiarity pattern that we have also found in previous surveys. The international media environment through which Argentines can form opinions about China is thus primarily shaped by Western and local outlets.

The media effect

Even with the limitation of a small subsample, one of the most interesting findings of this survey concerns the relationship between media consumption and perceptions. While 60% of the total sample holds a positive image of China, among respondents who consume Chinese media (CGTN and/or Global Times) the figure rises to 71%, and among those who consume only CNN and/or BBC, it drops to 57%. The difference is approximately 14 percentage points.

To deepen the analysis, we estimated a probability model controlling for political identity, region, age, gender, and education level in order to assess this effect. The result confirms that media consumption, together with political identity, is the strongest predictor of a positive image of China. CGTN and/or Global Times consumers have approximately twice the odds of holding a positive image compared with non-consumers, and 2.5 times the odds compared with exclusive CNN/BBC consumers. Measured as estimated probability, the positive image of China is 14 points higher among Chinese media consumers than the sample average (74% vs. 60%), and 21 points higher than among CNN/BBC consumers (74% vs. 53%).

The chart summarizes the results of a probit model estimating the contribution of each variable to the odds of holding a positive image of China, controlling for all others simultaneously. The key measure is the odds ratio: a value above 1.0 means the variable is associated with higher odds of positive perceptions, while a value below 1.0 implies lower odds. Colored points indicate statistically significant effects; grey points are not significant.

Two variables stand out. Peronist voters have approximately 70% higher odds of holding a positive image of China than respondents with no political affiliation (OR = 1.71), while CGTN or Global Times consumers also have approximately 70% higher odds than consumers of other media (OR = 1.70). In the opposite direction, LLA/Milei voters have approximately 27% lower odds (OR = 0.73) of viewing China positively compared with those without a declared political identity. These three effects are statistically significant.

CNN/BBC consumption is associated with a smaller reduction in odds (OR = 0.85) that does not reach statistical significance. Among demographic controls, age has a slight positive effect, while gender and education level show no association. Geographically, only Region 4 shows a marginally significant positive effect (OR = 1.43); the remaining regions show no defined trend.

The media effect also extends to other, more sensitive domains. CGTN and/or Global Times consumers are more likely to view the China–Latin America relationship positively (76% vs. 63% of the overall sample) and, crucially, to trust Chinese medications and vaccines (72% vs. 41%)—the only product category in which, at the overall level, distrust exceeded trust. It is important to stress, as usual, that correlation does not imply causation: there may be direct influence, but it is also possible that those who consume Chinese media are largely those who already held a positive image of the country.

Again, despite the small subsample, the composition of the Chinese media audience is itself interesting. Nearly half (46%) are Peronist voters, followed by non-political respondents (25%) and LLA/Milei voters (22%). The presence of a significant share of Milei voters among the CGTN and/or Global Times audience detected by the survey suggests that interest in the Chinese perspective extends beyond political affinity with Peronism.

Interest in content about China

Finally, respondents were asked to select up to three topics about China that they would like to learn more about or see more frequently in the media. In line with China's image as the leading technological power, technology is the topic of greatest interest: 35% named it as their first choice and 71% mentioned it among their top three. Strong interest also stands out for culture and history (16% first mention, 48% total), lifestyle (8% first mention, 49% total), and economy (15% first mention, 47% total).

Conclusions

The OLAC 2025 survey documents a persistent gap between the direction taken by Argentine foreign policy and the perceptions of its citizens. Six findings stand out.

First, China's positive image (+48 net) exceeds that of the United States (+20 net) by a wide margin. This is accompanied by favorable evaluations in specific domains, particularly technology and economic development, where the majority rates China positively.

Second, China's positive image is distributed across the political spectrum—even among Milei voters the net image is positive—while the US image is more polarized along partisan lines, with a strongly negative image among those opposed to the government.

Third, a majority projects China as the leading power in influence, economy, and technology over the next two decades, and a majority already considers China the current technology leader of the world.

Fourth, regarding great-power behavior on the international stage, 58% agreed that China respects the sovereignty of other nations, compared with 28% who say the same of the US. The 65-point net gap is among the largest findings of the survey. Perception of the China–Latin America relationship is broadly positive (64%), while that of the China–US relationship is more cautious (17%).

Fifth, 88% support strengthening ties with China, with a particularly strong consensus on the economic dimension (89%).

Sixth, media consumption—together with political identity—is the strongest predictor of a positive image of China. However, Chinese media reach only about 4.5% of the surveyed population, suggesting low presence but ample room for potential growth.

The results point to a tension between the orientation of official foreign policy and public sentiment regarding the international landscape and its main actors. Whether a foreign policy at odds with majority perceptions can be sustained in the medium term remains an open question.