Introduction

In August 2025, two months before Argentina's midterm elections, the Latin America–China Observatory (OLAC) at the University of Buenos Aires conducted a nationwide survey of 1,162 respondents across 29 localities in eight regions. The timing was deliberate. Argentina was undergoing one of the most intense periods of political polarisation in recent memory, and international relations had moved to the centre of public debate.

Under the presidency of Javier Milei, Argentina had pursued a reorientation of its foreign policy, building an exceptionally close relationship with the United States while adopting a confrontational posture toward Beijing. Milei rejected the invitation for Argentina to join BRICS, referred to China as "communist" and "authoritarian" on multiple occasions, and accepted the open endorsement of Donald Trump, whose Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent publicly called for Argentina to reduce its ties with China.

This orientation sits in tension with the economic realities of the bilateral relationship. China remains one of Argentina's most important trading partners, a strategic buyer of agricultural exports, an investor in energy and infrastructure, and a provider of financial support through the currency swap. In a context of economic crisis, persistent inflation, and a society split between supporters and opponents of the government's shock-therapy programme, these international alignments became a defining axis of political identity.

Our findings reveal a population that holds a broadly positive image of China across political lines, that anticipates Chinese global leadership in the coming decades, and that supports deepening bilateral ties by wide margins. These results carry implications for Argentine politics and for the broader dynamics of public opinion in a region increasingly situated between the two global powers.

Sample composition

The survey's geographic and demographic coverage reflects Argentina's population structure, with balanced representation by gender, age cohort, and educational attainment.

The image of nations

Respondents rated their image of five countries on a six-point scale from "very good" to "very poor." China's positive image (combining "very good" and "good") reaches 60%, compared to 46% for the United States. The negative image ("poor" and "very poor") stands at 12% for China and 26% for the US, yielding a net positive image of +48 for China and +20 for the United States.

Germany leads the overall ranking with 66% positive, followed by Brazil (65%), China (60%), the United States (46%), and Russia (33%). The gap between China and the US is particularly notable in a country whose government has explicitly aligned with Washington and adopted a hostile rhetorical stance toward Beijing.

Comparative attributes of nations

We also asked which country respondents associate most with four specific attributes: technology, economic development, international influence, and democracy. The results reveal differentiated perceptions that do not map neatly onto a single hierarchy.

In technology, China leads with 54%, followed by Japan (30%) and the United States (12%). In economic development, China also leads (44%), ahead of the US (27%) and Japan (13%). In international influence, however, the US dominates with 70%, with China at 17%. And in democracy, the US leads at 30%, followed by Brazil (21%) and Germany (17%), while China registers 2%.

Argentines appear to associate China primarily with technological and economic prowess, while recognising US preponderance in geopolitical influence and democratic credentials. That 14% answered "none" to the democracy question, and that Brazil ranks second, is itself a finding worth noting.

Perception of China across dimensions

Beyond the general image question, we asked respondents to rate their perception of China across four specific domains: technology and innovation, economic development, international politics, and political stability. The results show consistently positive assessments, with particularly high marks for the technological dimension.

In technology and innovation, 94% of respondents rate China positively (66% "very good," 28% "good"), with virtually no negative perceptions. In economic development, the positive perception reaches 89% (47% "very good," 42% "good"). The assessments of international politics (60% positive) and political stability (59% positive) are more moderate, with higher proportions of "fair" and "don't know" responses, reflecting greater uncertainty in areas where everyday familiarity is limited.

The politics of perception

Disaggregating these results by political identity reveals an asymmetry. China's positive image is widespread across the political spectrum, while the image of the United States is closely tied to partisan affiliation.

Among Peronist voters, 71% hold a positive image of China. Among those who declared no intention to vote, the figure is 61%. Among La Libertad Avanza (Milei) voters, a majority of 52% still view China positively. Only among PRO/UCR voters does China's approval dip below 50%, to 48%.

The US image follows a different pattern. Among LLA voters, 74% hold a positive view; among PRO/UCR, 72%. But among Peronists, just 16% see the US favourably, while 51% hold a negative view. The US image has become closely bound to partisan identity, appreciated on the right and rejected on the left. The direct involvement of the Trump administration in Argentine electoral politics may have contributed to this dynamic, while China's relatively stable diplomatic approach appears to have preserved its image from partisan fragmentation.

Present and future: who leads the world?

Through a series of open-ended questions, we asked respondents which country they consider the current and future leader in three domains: global influence, economic power, and technological development. The answers point toward a consistent pattern: perceptions of US predominance today coexist with expectations of Chinese leadership in the coming decades.

On global leadership, 64% named the US as the most influential country today, against 25% for China. For the future, the perception reverses: 51% chose China, 23% the US. The shift from a 39-point US advantage to a 28-point Chinese lead represents a notable change in outlook.

On economic power, the present gap is narrower (45% US vs. 39% China), suggesting that Argentines perceive the economic competition as more balanced. In the future projection, China leads 54% to 18%.

On technological development, a majority (53%) already identifies China as the current technological leader, ahead of Japan (31%) and the US (9%). In the projection to 20 years, China's lead expands to 59%. This perception is shared across political identities.

International relations: sovereignty and dialogue

We presented four statements about the international behaviour of China and the United States, asking for agreement on a four-point scale. Two were symmetrical: "China respects each country's political model" and "The United States respects each country's political model."

On China, 58% agreed (24% strongly, 34% somewhat); 35% disagreed. On the United States, 28% agreed (8% strongly, 20% somewhat); 70% disagreed (26% somewhat, 44% strongly). The net agreement gap between the two statements is 65 percentage points (+23 for China, −42 for the US).

The statement that "the US tends to act on its own while China prefers dialogue" received 65% agreement, while only 21% agreed that the US surpasses China in technology. The overall picture is one in which Argentines tend to perceive China as a more respectful and dialogue-oriented actor. This may be shaped by Latin America's historical experience with US interventionism and by the contrast with China's declared principle of non-interference.

Perception of bilateral relationships

We asked respondents how they perceive the current state of two bilateral relationships: China-US and China-Latin America. The contrast is clear. Only 17% view the China-US relationship as positive (1% "very good," 16% "good"), while 28% see it as negative and 53% as "fair." In contrast, 64% view the China-Latin America relationship positively (8% "very good," 56% "good"), with just 5% negative and 28% "fair."

Argentines appear to have a realistic assessment of the tensions in the China-US dynamic. Their reading of China's relationship with the region, meanwhile, is broadly positive, providing context for the strong support for deepening bilateral ties documented in the next section.

Argentina–China relations

When asked directly whether Argentina should strengthen its ties with China, 88% said yes (43% "yes, definitely" and 45% "yes, but with limits"). Only 10% said no. This level of agreement is unusual in a deeply polarised society and suggests a broadly shared pragmatic conviction about the strategic value of the relationship.

The support is strongest on the economic dimension: 89% consider it important to increase economic relations (57% "very important," 32% "somewhat important"). Political relations receive somewhat less enthusiastic but still majority support at 71% (34% "very important," 37% "somewhat"). The 18-point gap between the two reflects a pragmatic orientation: Argentines tend to value China primarily as an economic partner, with more caution about political alignment.

Perception of Chinese products

The historical stereotype of Chinese products as low-quality appears to have weakened considerably. Nearly half (48%) rated them "medium-high quality," and 16% said "high quality," yielding a combined positive assessment of 64%. Only 7% considered them "low quality."

Confidence varies by product category. Appliances lead at 82%, followed by smartphones and computers (79%) and cars (65%). The exception is medicines and vaccines, where mistrust (47%) exceeds confidence (41%), likely reflecting the political controversy around Sinopharm and Sinovac during the pandemic.

International news consumption

CNN leads with 31%, followed by BBC (12%), Telesur (10%), and RT (7%). Chinese media (CGTN and Global Times) reach roughly 3% each, or about 4.5% combined (the audiences partially overlap). 45% of respondents declared they watch no international media at all.

The gap between China's positive image and its negligible media presence in Argentina is worth highlighting. The informational environment through which Argentines form their views of China is overwhelmingly shaped by Western outlets.

Interest in content about China

Technology is the topic Argentines are most interested in learning about: 35% named it as their first choice and 71% mentioned it among their top three. Culture and history follow (16% first, 48% total), economy (15% first, 47% total), and lifestyle (8% first, 49% total). The priority given to technology is coherent with the perception of China as the world's current and future technological leader.

The media effect

One of the more analytically relevant findings of this survey concerns the relationship between media consumption and perceptions of China. Among respondents who consume Chinese media (CGTN and/or Global Times), 71% hold a positive image of China. Among consumers of both Chinese and Western media, the figure is 72%. Among those who watch only CNN and/or BBC, it drops to 57%. The difference is approximately 14 percentage points.

A probit model controlling for political identity, region, age, gender, and education confirms that media consumption is the strongest predictor of a positive image of China, surpassing political identity. Consumers of CGTN/GT have approximately double the odds of holding a positive image compared to non-consumers, and 2.5 times the odds compared to CNN/BBC-only consumers. Measured in predicted probability, the positive image of China is 14 points higher among Chinese-media consumers than the sample average (74% vs. 60%), and 21 points higher than among CNN/BBC consumers (74% vs. 53%).

The media effect extends to other questions as well. Consumers of CGTN/GT are more likely to view the China-Latin America relationship positively (76% vs. 63% for the overall sample), more likely to trust Chinese medicines and vaccines (72% vs. 41%), and more likely to agree that China respects each country's political model.

The composition of the Chinese-media audience is itself revealing. Nearly half (46%) are Peronist voters, followed by apolitical respondents (25%) and LLA/Milei voters (22%). The presence of a significant share of government-aligned voters suggests that interest in the Chinese perspective extends beyond opposition circles.

The forest plot summarises the results of a probit model that estimates how much each variable contributes to the probability of holding a positive image of China, controlling for all others simultaneously. The key measure is the odds ratio: a value above 1.0 means that variable is associated with a higher probability of positive perceptions, while a value below 1.0 means a lower probability. Coloured dots indicate statistically significant effects; grey dots are not significant.

Two variables stand out. Peronist voters are roughly 70% more likely to hold a positive image of China than politically unaffiliated respondents (OR = 1.71), while consumers of CGTN or Global Times are also about 70% more likely than consumers of other media (OR = 1.70). In the opposite direction, LLA/Milei voters are about 27% less likely (OR = 0.73) and PRO/UCR voters 44% less likely (OR = 0.56) to view China positively compared to those with no declared political identity. All four effects are statistically significant.

CNN/BBC consumption is associated with a modest reduction (OR = 0.85) that does not reach significance. Among demographic controls, age has a small positive effect, while gender and education show no association. Geographically, only Region 4 shows a marginally significant positive effect (OR = 1.43); the remaining regions display no systematic pattern, confirming that perceptions of China are shaped primarily by political identity and media consumption rather than by geography.

Conclusions

The OLAC 2025 survey documents a persistent gap between the direction of Argentina's foreign policy and the perceptions held by its citizens. Six findings stand out.

First, China's positive image (net +48) exceeds that of the United States (net +20) by a wide margin. This is accompanied by favourable assessments across specific domains, particularly technology and economic development, where overwhelming majorities rate China positively.

Second, China's image is broadly distributed across the political spectrum, while the US image tracks closely with partisan identity. Even among Milei voters, a majority holds a positive view of China.

Third, majorities project China as the leading power in influence, economics, and technology within two decades. A majority already considers China the world's current technological leader.

Fourth, 58% agree that China respects the sovereignty of other nations, against 28% who say the same of the US. The net gap of 65 points is among the survey's most notable results. The perception of the China-Latin America relationship is broadly positive (64%), while that of the China-US relationship is more cautious (17%).

Fifth, 88% support strengthening ties with China, with particularly strong consensus on the economic dimension (89%).

Sixth, media consumption is the strongest predictor of a positive image of China, surpassing political identity. Yet Chinese media reach barely 4.5% of the population, suggesting considerable room for growth in audience and influence.

Taken together, these results point to a tension between official policy and public sentiment that spans the political landscape. Whether a foreign policy at odds with majority perceptions can be sustained in the medium term remains an open question.