Introduction

In August 2025, two months before Argentina's midterm legislative elections, the Latin America–China Observatory (OLAC) at the University of Buenos Aires conducted a national survey of 1,162 people across 29 localities in eight regions. The timing was deliberate. Argentina was going through one of the most intense periods of political polarization in its recent history, and international relations had moved to the center of public debate.

Under the presidency of Javier Milei, Argentina had undertaken a reorientation of its foreign policy, building an exceptionally close relationship with the United States and adopting a confrontational stance toward Beijing. Milei rejected the invitation for Argentina to join BRICS, referred to China as "communist" and "authoritarian" on multiple occasions, and accepted the open endorsement of Donald Trump, whose Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessent, publicly urged Argentina to reduce its ties with China.

This orientation stands in tension with the economic realities of the bilateral relationship. China remains one of Argentina's most important trade partners, a strategic buyer of agricultural exports, an investor in energy and infrastructure, and a provider of financial support through the currency swap. In a context of economic crisis, persistent inflation, and a society divided between supporters and opponents of the government's austerity program, these international alignments became articulators of political identities.

The survey results reveal a population that maintains a positive image of China with a degree of cross-cutting support across political alignments, in contrast to a politically polarized image of the U.S.; that perceives China as the global leader of the coming decades; and that supports the deepening of bilateral ties by wide margins. These findings challenge, in part, the usual assumptions about local politics and public opinion, in a region that is already feeling the weight—at times overwhelming—of the dispute between the two global powers.

Sample Composition

The sample is semi-probabilistic, weighted by gender, age, region, and education level. Its geographic and demographic coverage reflects Argentina's population structure.

The Image of Nations

At the start of the survey, respondents rated their image of five countries on a six-point scale, from "very good" to "very bad." The positive image of China (combining "very good" and "good") reaches 60%, compared to 46% for the United States. The negative image ("bad" and "very bad") stands at 12% for China and 26% for the U.S., yielding a net positive image of +48 for China and +20 for the United States.

Germany leads the overall ranking with 66% positive image, followed by Brazil (65%), China (60%), the United States (46%), and Russia (33%). The gap between China and the U.S. is particularly striking in a country whose government has explicitly aligned with Washington and adopted a rhetorically hostile stance toward Beijing.

Comparative Attributes of Nations

Respondents were also asked which country they most associate with four specific attributes: technology, economic development, international influence, and democracy. The results do not conform uniformly to a single hierarchy.

In technology, China leads with 54%, followed by Japan (30%) and the United States (12%). In economic development, China also leads (44%), ahead of the U.S. (27%) and Japan (13%). In international influence, however, the U.S. dominates with 70%, with China at 17%. And in democracy, the U.S. leads with 30%, followed by Brazil (21%) and Germany (17%), while China registers 2%.

Argentines seem to associate China primarily with technological and economic capability, while recognizing U.S. hegemony in geopolitical influence and still granting it democratic credentials. In this regard, the fact that 14% responded "none" to the democracy question, and that Brazil ranked second, is itself noteworthy.

Perception of China Across Dimensions

Beyond the comparative questions between countries, respondents were asked to rate their perception of China in four specific domains: technology and innovation, economic development, international politics, and political stability, yielding consistently positive evaluations, with particularly high ratings in the technological dimension.

In technology and innovation, 94% of respondents rate China positively (66% "very good," 28% "good"), with virtually no negative perceptions. In economic development, the positive perception reaches 89% (47% "very good," 42% "good"). The evaluations of international politics (60% positive) and political stability (59% positive) are more moderate, with higher proportions of "fair" and "don't know/no answer" responses, reflecting greater uncertainty in areas where everyday familiarity is limited.

The Politics of Perception

The disaggregation of results by political identity reveals an asymmetry in the image of China compared to that of the U.S. The positive image of China is spread across the political spectrum, while the image of the United States is closely tied to partisan affiliation.

Among Peronist voters, 71% have a positive image of China. Among those who declared no voting intention, the figure is 61%. Among La Libertad Avanza (Milei) voters, a majority of 52% still view China positively. Only among PRO/UCR voters does China's approval fall below 50%, to 48%.

The image of the U.S. is distributed differently. Among LLA voters, 74% have a positive view; among PRO/UCR voters, 72%. But among Peronists, only 16% view the U.S. favorably, while 51% have a negative view. The image of the U.S. is captive to political polarization, strongly associated with partisan identity, appreciated on the right and rejected on the left. The Trump administration's direct intervention in Argentine electoral politics may have contributed to this dynamic, while China's steady diplomatic approach may be part of the explanation for the preservation of its image in the face of partisan polarization.

Present and Future: Who Leads the World?

Through a series of open-ended questions, respondents were asked which country they consider the current and future leader in three domains: global influence, economic power, and technological development. The responses point to a clear trend: perceptions of American predominance at present coexist with expectations of Chinese leadership in the coming decades.

In global leadership, 64% named the U.S. as the most influential country at present, compared to 25% for China. For the future, the perception is reversed: 51% chose China, 23% the U.S. The shift from a 39-point American advantage to a 28-point Chinese advantage represents an aggressive change in medium-term expectations.

In economic power, the current gap is narrower (45% U.S. vs. 39% China), suggesting that Argentines perceive economic competition as more evenly matched. In the future projection, China leads with 54% versus 18%.

In technological development, a majority (53%) already identifies China as the current technological leader, ahead of Japan (31%) and the U.S. (9%). In the 20-year projection, China's advantage widens to 59%. This perception was shared across political identities.

International Relations: Sovereignty and Dialogue

Four statements about the international behavior of China and the United States were presented, requesting the degree of agreement on a four-point scale. Two were symmetrical: "China respects each country's political model" and "The United States respects each country's political model."

Regarding China, 58% agreed (24% strongly agree, 34% somewhat agree); 35% disagreed. Regarding the United States, 28% agreed (8% strongly agree, 20% somewhat agree); 70% disagreed (26% somewhat disagree, 44% strongly disagree). The net agreement gap between the two statements is 65 percentage points (+23 for China, −42 for the U.S.).

The statement that "the U.S. tends to act alone while China prefers dialogue" received 65% agreement, while only 21% agreed that the U.S. surpasses China in technology. The overall picture is one in which Argentines tend to perceive China as a more respectful and dialogue-oriented actor. This may be shaped by Latin America's historical experience with American interventionism and by the contrast with China's declared principle of non-interference.

Perception of Bilateral Relations

Respondents were asked how they perceive the current state of two bilateral relationships: China-U.S. and China-Latin America. The contrast is clear. While only 17% consider the China-U.S. relationship positive (1% "very good," 16% "good"), 28% view it as negative and 53% as "fair." In contrast, 64% consider the China-Latin America relationship positive (8% "very good," 56% "good"), with only 5% negative and 28% "fair."

Argentina–China Relations

Regarding the bilateral relationship, when respondents were asked whether they believe Argentina should strengthen its ties with China, 88% responded affirmatively (43% "yes, without a doubt" and 45% "yes, but with limits"). Only 10% responded negatively. This level of agreement is unusual in a highly polarized society and suggests a widespread pragmatic conviction about the strategic value of the relationship.

Support is stronger in the economic dimension: 89% consider it important to increase economic relations (57% "very important," 32% "somewhat important"). Political relations receive somewhat less enthusiastic but still majority support, at 71% (34% "very important," 37% "somewhat important"). The 18-point gap between the two reflects a pragmatic orientation: Argentines tend to value China primarily as an economic partner, with greater caution regarding political alignment.

Perception of Chinese Products

Respondents were asked about their general perception of the quality of products manufactured in China, as well as their degree of confidence in specific categories. The historical stereotype of Chinese products as low quality appears to have weakened considerably. Nearly half (48%) rated them as "medium-high quality" and 16% said "high quality," yielding a combined positive evaluation of 64%. Only 7% considered them "low quality."

Confidence varies by product category. Home appliances lead with 82%, followed by smartphones and computers (79%) and automobiles (65%). The exception is medicines and vaccines, where distrust (47%) exceeds trust (41%), likely reflecting the political controversy surrounding Sinopharm and Sinovac during the pandemic.

International News Consumption

In a dedicated media module, respondents were asked which international media outlets they consume at least occasionally, from a predefined list of options. CNN leads with 31%, followed by BBC (12%), Telesur (10%), and RT (7%). Chinese media (CGTN and Global Times) reach approximately 3% each, close to a combined 4.5% (audiences partially overlap). 45% of respondents reported not consuming any international media.

The gap between the positive image of China and its low media presence in Argentina is part of the pattern of high valuation and low knowledge, which we have also found in previous surveys. Thus, the international media environment through which Argentines can form opinions about China is shaped above all by Western and local media.

Interest in Content About China

Respondents were asked to select up to three topics about China they would like to learn about or see more frequently in the media. Technology is the topic of greatest interest to Argentines: 35% named it as their first choice and 71% mentioned it among their top three. It is followed by culture and history (16% first mention, 48% total), economy (15% first mention, 47% total), and lifestyle (8% first mention, 49% total). The priority given to technology is consistent with the perception of China as the world's current and future technological leader.

The Media Effect

Even with the limitation of a small subsample, one of the most interesting findings of this survey concerns the relationship between media consumption and perceptions of China. While in the total sample 60% have a positive image of China, among respondents who consume Chinese media (CGTN and/or Global Times) the figure rises to 71%, and among those who consume only CNN and/or BBC, it falls to 57%. The difference is approximately 14 percentage points.

We estimated a probit model controlling for political identity, region, age, gender, and education level to evaluate this effect. The result confirms that media consumption, together with political identity, is the strongest predictor of a positive image of China. Consumers of CGTN and/or Global Times have approximately twice the odds of having a positive image compared to non-consumers, and 2.5 times the odds compared to exclusive CNN/BBC consumers. Measured in estimated probability, the positive image of China is 14 points higher among Chinese media consumers than the sample average (74% vs. 60%), and 21 points higher than among CNN/BBC consumers (74% vs. 53%).

The media effect also extends to other more sensitive domains. Consumers of CGTN and/or Global Times are more likely to view the China-Latin America relationship positively (76% vs. 63% of the general sample) and, crucially, to trust Chinese medicines and vaccines (72% vs. 41%), the only product category in which distrust exceeded trust at the general level. It is important to emphasize, as always, that correlation does not imply causation: there may be a direct influence, but it is also possible that those who consume Chinese media are largely those who already had a positive image of the country.

Again, despite the small subsample, the composition of the Chinese media audience is itself interesting. Nearly half (46%) are Peronist voters, followed by apolitical respondents (25%) and LLA/Milei voters (22%). The presence of a significant proportion of Milei voters among the audience of CGTN and/or Global Times detected by the survey suggests that interest in the Chinese perspective extends beyond opposition circles.

The forest plot summarizes the results of a probit model that estimates the contribution of each variable to the odds of having a positive image of China, controlling for all others simultaneously. The key measure is the odds ratio: a value above 1.0 means that variable is associated with higher odds of positive perceptions, while a value below 1.0 implies lower odds. Colored dots indicate statistically significant effects; gray dots are not significant.

Two variables stand out. Peronist voters have approximately 70% higher odds of having a positive image of China than respondents with no political affiliation (OR = 1.71), while consumers of CGTN or Global Times also have approximately 70% higher odds than consumers of other media (OR = 1.70). In the opposite direction, LLA/Milei voters have approximately 27% lower odds (OR = 0.73) and PRO/UCR voters 44% lower odds (OR = 0.56) of viewing China positively compared to those with no declared political identity. All four effects are statistically significant.

CNN/BBC consumption is associated with a smaller reduction in odds (OR = 0.85) that does not reach statistical significance. Among demographic controls, age has a slight positive effect, while gender and education level show no association. Geographically, only Region 4 shows a marginally significant positive effect (OR = 1.43); the remaining regions show no defined trend.

Conclusions

The OLAC 2025 survey documents a persistent gap between the direction adopted by Argentine foreign policy and the perceptions of its citizens. Six findings stand out.

First, the positive image of China (net +48) exceeds that of the United States (net +20) by a wide margin. This is accompanied by favorable evaluations in specific domains, particularly technology and economic development, where large majorities rate China positively.

Second, the positive image of China is distributed across the political spectrum, and even among Milei voters the net image is positive, while the image of the U.S. is more polarized along partisan identity lines, with a strongly negative image among the opposition to the government.

Third, the majority projects China as the leading power in influence, economy, and technology over the next two decades, and a majority already considers China the world's current technological leader.

Fourth, regarding the behavior of powers in the international arena, 58% agreed that China respects the sovereignty of other nations, compared to 28% who say the same about the U.S. The net gap of 65 points is among the survey's largest findings. The perception of the China-Latin America relationship is broadly positive (64%), while that of the China-U.S. relationship is more cautious (17%).

Fifth, 88% support strengthening ties with China, with particularly strong consensus in the economic dimension (89%).

Sixth, media consumption together with political identity is the strongest predictor of a positive image of China. However, Chinese media barely reach 4.5% of the surveyed population, suggesting low presence but a wide margin for potential growth.

Taken together, these results point to a tension between official policy and public sentiment that cuts across the political landscape. Whether a foreign policy at odds with majority perceptions can be sustained in the medium term remains an open question.